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Introduction 
This article aims to show the current situation surrounding the right to privacy in the 
Spanish legal system. First of all, we look at the regulations governing the right to 
privacy and at the characteristics of the Spanish protection of privacy. In the second part 
of the paper, we consider the current regulations on personal data protection as the 
grounds for new ways of protecting privacy. Finally, the paper shows how two new 
rights have emerged from the legal discourse on privacy and, overall, from the 
regulation of the protection of personal data: informative self-determination and the 
right to be forgotten. This study focuses on the latter, due to the prominent role of 
Spanish judges in shaping the incipient right to be forgotten via inter-action with the 
European Court of Justice in 2014. 
 
Right to Privacy 
 
The Precedents to the Spanish Right to Privacy 
 
One of the first precedents of the right to privacy in Spain can be found in a Supreme 
Court decision from 6 December 1912. After a romantic relationship between a priest 
and a teenager was discussed in the press, the doctrine on reparations for moral damage 
was applied in Spain for the first time. This decision was followed by other decisions by 
the state and regional courts (many authors have studied the Supreme Court's decision 
and its influence; among them, Pérez Fuertes (2004) and, previously, De la Valgoma, 
(1983); Díez Picazo, (1979); and Herrero Tejedor, (1990)). Their arguments show the 
remarkable influence of American and French jurisprudence, particularly in the 
application of the civil law principle "neminem laedere" – unfair damage cannot be 
caused to anybody without creating a responsi-bility to repairing the evil– as the starting 
point for building the right to privacy. American and French judges have extended the 
application of this principle to many acts concerning moral damage, which are different 
from acts against reputation.   
 
Characteristics of Privacy Protection in Spanish Law 
The protection of privacy in Spain has certain particularities. A noteworthy charac-
teristic is the clear difference between the right to privacy and right to one’s own image. 
In Spain, privacy and image are regulated as if these were two substantive rights, linked 
to one another but different in their aims. Taking this difference into account, the right 
to privacy has the purpose of keeping a personal space free from the outsiders' gaze; 
meanwhile, the right to one’s own image tries to guarantee for each person the exclusive 
use of his or her image. The second characteristic of the Spanish system related to 
privacy is the exhaustive legal regulation of the subject, based on three kinds of 
protection: constitutional, criminal and civil protection. These are regulated by the 
Constitution of 1978, art. 18 and 20, and by the Criminal Code of 1995, art. 197, 
respectively; and by the Civil Protection Law on the Rights of Reputation, Privacy and 
the Right to One’s Own Image, n. 1/1982, May 5th. This broad range of laws on privacy 
is due to the consistent development of the “gossip” press, which is called “Prensa del 
Corazón” or “Periodismo Rosa” in Spanish. This began during the 1960s with 
magazines like ¡Hola!, a magazine that, even today, is leading in its genre with editions 
in other countries and languages, such as the American and British Hello!. Tabloid 
journalism was expanded in the late 1980s when commercial television introduced 
programs of similar content. Precisely this abundance of magazines and TV programs 
focussed on celebrities of film, television, fashion and royalty and their personal and 
family lives has caused a high number of cases in tribunals. In consequence, a high 
priority was given to the privacy rights of celebrities. The very intensity of the law’s 
attention towards celebrities had neglected the privacy of ordinary citizens. However, 
the circumstances changed with the arrival of two technological innovations: databases 
and the Internet. 
The Protection of Personal Data 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the protection of privacy, both in Spain and in other European 
countries, had adopted the point of view of the celebrities, and, as a main factor of 
danger, the media. Therefore, the principle representing this perspective is that the 
sphere of privacy shouldn't be violated by paparazzi, cameras or journalists. The step 
that followed came from a simple technological change: the transformation of big 
computers to manageable devices in offices, public and private institutions, hospitals, 
banks, university departments, stores, etc. One consequence of the usual work with 
these new kinds of computers in a variety of businesses, public administrative offices, 
banks, etc. has been the feasibility of processing personal data. The alert about the risks 
for privacy came from the moment in which it was easy to indiscriminately register and 
transfer the data of millions of citizens. This was the time of the first European 
Convention for the Protection of Personal Data (1981), and of the European Directive 
for the Protection of Personal Data (1995), and the time of the first national laws on the 
subject. In Spain, the first law on personal data was enacted in 1992, and it was replaced 
by the Law 15/1999 ‘de Protección de Datos personales’ (Data Protection Act). 
 
The Protection on the Internet 
The protection on the Internet, specifically when facing search engines, is the key to 
understanding the frontline of today’s battle for privacy. From the digitization of 
newspapers and the development of blogs and social networks, a strong need arose for 
methods of protecting privacy that were more adequate for the era of the Internet. In the 
end, our society needs efficient regulation in order to avoid the uncontrollable 
dissemination of infringements against privacy; regulation that must react quickly and 
proportionate to the issue of offenses against privacy. Cases like Mario Costeja v 
Google (2014) or Els Alfacs v Google (2010) render the inefficiency of existing rules 
visible and voice the demand for new rights such as the right to be forgotten. 
 
Data Protection and the Right of Self-Informative Determination: the Roots of the 
Right to be Forgotten 
Data Protection: Law 15/1999 ‘de Protección de Datos personales’(Data Protection 
Act) 
In the same way that the success of Warren and Brandeis' concept of the ‘right to 
privacy’ was due to the new risks resulting from photographic technology, espe-cially 
when applied by the media, the interaction of digital communication in the 1990s 
brought a new kind of threat to private life and, consequently, generated a new kind of 
right: the right to personal data protection. The main question at the time was not only 
privacy –which was sometimes in danger – but the real risk of manipulation in that 
some organization – the state, police, companies, banks, polit-ical parties, different 
public departments involving health, labour, etc. – could affect individuals by creating 
exhaustive and detailed profiles (with aspects related to a variety of interests of the 
institutions and businesses above). Reacting to this threat, the European Union enacted 
three important directives, all of which are focused on different aspects of personal data 
protection: 
1. Directive 95/46/EC (on Personal Data) ‘on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data’ 
2. Directive 2002/58/EC (on Privacy and Electronic Communications) ‘concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector’ 
3. Directive 2006/24/EC (on the Retention of Data) ‘on the retention of data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks’ 
Following these European normative directions, Spanish regulators enacted Law 
15/1999, ‘de Protección de Datos Personales’ (Data Protection Act). Its main purpose is 
"the protection of people’s freedom and fundamental rights, especially their right to 
reputation and the right to privacy” [Article 1]. Five significant elements can be pointed 
out in this Data Protection Act, 1999: 
1. The data protection principles [Article 4 to 12]; 
2. The citizen rights [Article 13 to 19], which include the right to access to 
personal data irrespective to location; the right to know about the existence of 
personal data; the right to correct data; and the right to delete data. 
3. The regulation of any kind of files [Article 20 to 33]. 
4. The creation of the Data Protection Agency (Agencia de Protección de 
Datos)[Article 35 to 42]. 
5. Infractions and sanctions [Article 43 to 49] 
The Data Protection Act, 1999, intends to balance the right to reputation and privacy on 
one hand, and the requirements of the state and public authorities such as governments, 
police, social security, the treasury of income tax departments, etc. as well as 
companies, on the other. It tries to guarantee fundamental rights when there is some 
‘necessary use’ or ‘interested use’. There are three principles which help in this balance: 
1. The principle of quality of data: this means not only that the personal data 
included must be true, but also that this data can only be held for a temporary 
period. 
2. The right to information when the data is requested by people. 
3. The principle of assumed consent given to anyone who requests access to the 
data. 
A New Constitutional Right to Self-Informative Determination 
The Constitutional Court goes beyond Law 15/1999 ‘de Protección de Datos 
personales’. Following its own arguments in three resolutions dealing with data 
protection, the Constitutional Court has recognised a right related to privacy and the 
protection of personal data but, at the same time, much more focused on personal 
identity. The first case was the denial of information from the regional institution 
‘Gobierno Civil’, which at that time was a representative of the central government to a 
citizen who was asking about personal data that was supposedly held by the ‘Gobierno 
Civil’ [STC 254/1993]. In the second case, a bank denied an employee’s request to 
delete his medical record from the bank’s database.[STC 202/1999]. The third case was 
the constitutional procedure against articles of the Law 15/1999, ‘de Protección de 
Datos personales’ (Data Protection Act) [STC 292/2000]. The Constitutional Court 
states that the protection of personal data: 
‘…is an answer to one new threat against human dignity and personal rights (…); and also it is, by 
itself, a new right or a new fundamental freedom’ [STC 292/2000, Fundamento jurídico 4]. 
This right is different from the “right to privacy, art. 18.1 CE, with which it shares the 
aim of an efficient protection to privacy” [STC 292/2000, Fundamento jurídico 6]. The 
peculiarity of the right of protection of personal data lies in its different function, which 
is the guarantee to any individual to be in control of this data, and at a lower level, the 
defence of privacy. [cf. STC 292/2000, Fundamento jurídico 6]. The Constitutional 
Court states precisely on the subject of the right of data protection: 
“The object of the fundamental right of personal data protection is not only the privacy – the 
individual intimate data – but any kind of personal data, even if it is not intimate, when the 
knowledge or the use of this data by a third party can diminish the rights of a particular person. It 
doesn’t matter if the rights concerned are or are not fundamental, because the object (of the right 
of personal data protection) is not only the individual intimacy – for that purpose there is the 
protection of art. 18.1 CE – but the personal data. Therefore, this right also has to do with the 
personal data which is public and accessible to anyone. But even here, the right of the protection of 
personal data must be efficient” [STC 292/2000, Fundamento jurídico 6]. 
As a consequence, the protection of personal data goes beyond the right to privacy: 
“…the data protected (by the right of protection of personal data) is all that which identifies or 
allows the identification of one person; it can be ideological data, sexual, religious, economic data 
or any type; (the collection of this data and its manipulation) in particular circumstances can 
constitute a threat to individuals” (cfr STC 292/2000, Fundamento jurídico 6). 
In respect to the protection of personal data 
 “…the prerogative to dispose of, and to control personal data means that every person has the 
faculty to decide which parts of their data can be transferred to a third party; it doesn’t matter if 
this third party is the state or an individual; or which personal data can be collected by this third 
party. At the same time, this right allows a person to know who has access to their personal data 
and for what purpose. Therefore, they can oppose this possession or use” (STC 292/2000, 
Fundamento jurídico 6). 
It is precisely in this point that the right of informative self-determination connects with 
the right to be forgotten, a right that has been recognised only recently. Both rights can 
be defined as versions of the right to privacy adjusted to the information society.   
 
The Right to be Forgotten: An Aspect of the Right to Self-Informative 
Determination  
 The Spanish Initiative for the Acknowledgement of the Right to be Forgotten 
One of the first consequences of the right of informative self-determination is more 
effective protection against the possible threat to personal freedom posed by the power 
of the immense amount of collected data. It is a power which mainly lies in its capacity 
to predict the behaviour of millions of persons. This is made possible through the 
knowledge of people’s interests, their personal communications, their exchanges of 
opinions, their favourite sites, their professional acts, their online shopping, their 
pictures, etc. all of which has been gathered over the past years. The power is also 
strengthened by the generation of digital identities which accompany citizens 
throughout their lives. These digital identities are built and traced by different 
institutions and companies on the Internet and can interfere in decisions taken by others 
in relation to a particular person. Even one’s own decision-making process can be 
affected, as long as the information, the offers or the advertisements that a person 
receives, are determined by their specific digital identity. This is the scope of 
vulnerabilities that need to be protected by the new versions of the right to privacy 
(Tene, 2011). The problem was raised in the Spanish National High Court’s prelim-
inary question towards the European Court of Justice in the case of Mario Costeja 
(2014), which has another precedent in Spain: the Els Alfacs case (2010). Mario Costeja 
had suffered damage over the years as the result of an advertisement placed in the La 
Vanguardia newspaper in 1998 for a foreclosure sale related to debts he owed to the 
social security administration. When the newspaper was digitalised, Google searches for 
the name ‘Mario Costeja’ revealed personal data and financial information that had 
become outdated. This greatly affected his professional life. At first, Costeja filed a 
petition before the Spanish Data Protection Agency (SDPA), requesting for the 
newspaper to remove the information, but his petition was not successful. The SDPA 
stated that the advertisement published in the La Vanguardia newspaper was legal and 
that its removal would infringe upon freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the SDPA 
sent a request directed to Google Spain and Google Inc., calling upon these companies 
to stop indexing the aforementioned content. Google filed an appeal against the 
agency’s decision  (and other similar decisions)   before the National High Court. It was 
this judicial authority that ultimately referred this question for a preliminary ruling to 
the European Court of Justice. 
The Els Alfacs case concerned a company owning a campground that had been the site 
of a horrific tragedy in 1978 in which a truck carrying propylene exploded, killing over 
200 people. In 2010 the company filed a lawsuit against Google Spain for ignoring an 
earlier petition requesting that the search engine stop placing news about the accident at 
the top of searches of the campground’s name. The complain-ants demanded both the 
right to be forgotten and the company’s rights to honour, privacy and self-image. The 
company wanted Google to filter the search results and differentiate between those who 
were looking for information on the tragedy and those who merely sought information 
about the campground, since the way Google presented the search results at that time 
resulted in serious damage to the company. 
In both cases, the personal information involved had been disseminated in pro-portion 
to its relevance when it was initially published, but the fact that this information was 
still widely available to a large audience ten to fifteen years after the original incidents 
did not appear to be logical if it caused substantial moral and economic damages and the 
circumstances that led to its publication no longer existed. 
 
The European Court of Justice’s Sentence in the Spanish Case of Mario Costeja v. 
Google, May 13th, 2014 
Many authors have provided exhaustive commentaries on the decision of the European 
Court of Justice regarding the preliminary questions raised by the Spanish Na-tional 
High Court on the Mario Costeja v Google case (Andrés Boix Palop, 2015, Nieves 
Busán García, 2014, Lorenzo Cotino Hueso, 2015, Artemi Rallo, 2014 Gregory Voss, 
2014). For this reason reference will only be given to arguments that are directly linked 
to the recognition of the right to be forgotten. The Spanish National High Court raised 
four doubts about the interpretation of the directive concerning Data Protection 95/46, 
in 2012, through three preliminary questions raised to the European Court of Justice: 
1. Whether the indexation of research engines should be considered “data 
processing” (Preliminary question 1, part 1); 
2. Whether Google.es can be considered a company headquartered in Spain or 
rather an affiliate of American Google (Preliminary question 1, part 2); 
3. Whether the manager of a search engine must delete links to websites collected 
in search results (Preliminary question 2); 
4. Whether an individual can request that the manager of a search engine delete 
both data and information if this data and information can damage them or for 
the simpler reason that this individual wants the data and information 
“forgotten” after a period of time (Preliminary question 3). 
Of these, Preliminary questions 2 and 3 are more directly connected with our subject of 
study. In opposition to the request to delete links to the web sites collected among the 
search results, Google submitted to the Spanish National High Court, that:  
N. 63: “by virtue of the principle of proportionality, any request seeking the removal of 
information must be addressed to the publisher of the website concerned because it is they who 
takes the responsibility for making the information public, who are in a position to appraise the 
lawfulness of that publication and who has available to them the most effective and least restrictive 
means of making the information inaccessible. Furthermore, to require the operator of a search 
engine to withdraw information published on the internet from its indexes would take insufficient 
account of the fundamental rights of publishers of websites, of other internet users and of that 
operator itself.” (Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 13 May 2014 Google Spain SL and 
Google Inc v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Coseja González 
(Case C-131/12) ECLI:EU:C:2014:317) or (Case C-131/12, 13 May 2014 Google Spain SL and 
Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González). 
Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice interpreted that the directive on Data 
Protection requires the manager of the search engine to take responsibility for the 
processing of personal data involved in its service: 
“N. 72: (art. 6 Directive of Data Protection) Under Article 6 of Directive 95/46 and without 
prejudice to specific provisions that the Member States may lay down in respect of processing for 
historical, statistical or scientific purposes, the controller has the task of ensuring that personal data 
is processed ‘fairly and lawfully’, that it is ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes 
and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes’, that it is ‘adequate, relevant 
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed’, 
that it is ‘accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date’”. 
 
As a consequence, it was determined that a user can address a request to delete personal 
data from a website towards the search engine: 
“N.77: Requests under Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of 
Directive 95/46 may be addressed by the data, subject directly to the controller who must then duly 
examine their merits and, as the case may be, end processing of the data in question. Where the 
controller does not grant the request, the data subject may bring the matter before the supervisory 
authority or the judicial authority (…)” 
The Spanish National High Court also raised in its third preliminary question: 
“N. 83: Can the interpretation of Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of 
Article 14 of Directive 95/46 be that which enables the data subject to require the operator of a 
search engine to remove from the list of results (...) on the ground that that information may be 
prejudicial to them or that they wish it to be ‘forgotten’ after a certain time?” (Preliminary 
question 3). 
Google had said that, in these last circumstances, the deletion of the links from the 
search results cannot be requested, because it is not logical that the simple will of 
forgetting information about a person justifies the duty of the search engine to delete it: 
“N 90: […] confer rights upon data subjects only if the processing in question is incompatible with 
the directive or on compelling legitimate grounds relating to their particular situation and not 
merely because they consider that that processing may be prejudicial to them or they wish that the 
data being processed sink into oblivion”. 
On the contrary, the European Court of Justice insisted that it is possible to oblige the 
search engine to delete these contents, because: 
“N. 93: even initially lawful processing of accurate data may, in the course of time, become 
incompatible with the directive where the data is no longer necessary in the light of the purposes 
for which it was collected or processed. This is particularly so where it appears to be inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the 
time that has elapsed”. 
his means that requests for the deletion of personal data should be resolved on a case by 
case basis, taking into consideration the criteria mentioned by this decision and the 
European legislation, relating to the exactitude, adequacy, relevance –including the 
elapsed time – and the proportionality of the links in relation to personal data processing 
(Cfr. N. 93). 
 
Balancing Rights in the Application of the Right to be Forgotten 
Following the text of the decision of the European Court of Justice in the case Mario 
Costeja v. Google, the examination of proportionality among the rights which ask for 
the deletion of the search results (privacy and personal data) and those which protect the 
economic benefit derived from data processing, as well as the satisfaction of interest of 
the public for the access to information, the opinion of the European Court of Justice is 
the absolute prevalence of the fundamental rights: 
“N. 99: As the data subject may, in the light of their fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter, request that the information in question no longer be made available to the general 
public on account of its inclusion in such a list of results, those rights override, as a rule, not only 
the economic interest of the operator of the search engine but also the interest of the general public 
in having access to that information upon a search relating to the data subject’s name”. 
In circumstances where the individuals – because of their activities or personalities- 
have a public profile, the possibility to request of the search engine to delete personal 
data is much more limited: 
“N.99: However, that would not be the case if it appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role 
played by the data subject in public life, that interference with their fundamental rights is justified 
by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of its inclusion in the list 
of results, access to the information in question.” 
In any case, due to the certainty of the statement it is surprising that the right to privacy 
and the right to the protection of personal data take precedence over the public’s right to 
have access to all information on the Internet. This is especially interesting since the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the majority of European countries, Spain among them, 
has chosen to examine on a case by case basis the criteria in cases of conflict between 
the right to information and freedom of expression and the rights of reputation, privacy 
and self-image, all without having established the precedence of one right over the 
others. In some way, the decision of the European Court of Justice in this case builds a 
defence of privacy against a new dimension of risk generated by the Internet and search 
engines. This danger affects not only celebrities and public persons, but all individuals. 
Citizens can therefore see that there are thousands of Internet pages linked to their 
names. These include pictures of individuals, captured and spread on the Internet by 
third parties; pictures from private lives or from public situations, recent or from the 
past; content with personal references in official newspapers – all of which are available 
online today – including a diversity of professional or legal topics related to that 
particular person; and also in any digital newspaper or blog, recently published or, 
conversely, published many years ago, etc., including home addresses, telephone 
numbers, email accounts, commentaries by third persons involving personal issues, and 
a long list of possibilities of damage to privacy. Some content is registered on a second 
level by the companies operating the Internet – content which is connected to tastes, 
habits, hobbies and addictions. There are also unsolved issues such as the possibility 
that, once personal data is deleted from a search index, the normal activity of search 
engines can lead to the data being indexed again (Artemi, 2014). This can also occur if a 
search is made not by a person’s name but by other criteria, such as an offensive or 
insulting word which leads to search results connected to the person’s name (Buisán 
García, 2014). Also, it is necessary to determine the criteria that balance interests more 
nar-rowly to make it easier for search engines to face requests for the right to be forgot-
ten (Mieres Mieres, 2014). The European Court of Justice has chosen to place the right 
to be forgotten as one of the elements of the right of informative self-determination. 
Andrés Boix Palop observed that the right to be forgotten   
“is not a derivation of the privacy guarantees, but a consequence of the idea of  
(Autodeterminación Informativa) informative self-determination (art. 18.4 Spanish Constitution 
and art. 8 of the Bill of Rights of the European Union), and therefore, this right has a different 
profile to the other rights of personality set by art. 18 of the Spanish Constitution (the right to 
privacy and right to protection of personal data), rights which, in some ways, have been shaped, 
legally speaking, by the regulations on data protection. There are consequences arising from this, 
especially in the relationship between these rights and freedom of expression” (Boix Palop, 2015). 
 In any case, the decision of the European Court of Justice represents an important push 
in the current reform of personal data, in which the court wanted the “right to be 
forgotten” to be included. Remarkably, as Andrés Boix Palop points out, “beyond the 
existing dogmatic constructions of the ‘right to be forgotten’ it is important to say that, 
as from the ‘Google Decision’ of the European Court of Justice, this right is now 
recognised by European Law as a true right” (Boix Palop, 2015). 
 
The Application of the Sentence of the European Court of Justice on Google v 
Spain by the Decision of December 29th 2014 Taken by the Audiencia Nacional 
(National High Court) 
The Administrative Chamber of the National High Court finally decided the Mario 
Costeja case in its decision of December 29, 2014, published January 23, 2015, to 
which the arguments of the European Court of Justice’s decision of May 13, 2014, were 
applied. It was the first time that a Spanish court recognised the right to be forgotten, 
and at the same time this decision set the criteria for balancing possible conflicts. The 
right to be forgotten was described as a “personal power of decision over a person’s 
own data published on the Internet” (Fundamento de Derecho 13. Criteria for 
balancing). It is a definition in line with the one which the National High Court 
presented to the European Court of Justice in its third preliminary question which asked 
whether a citizen has the right to directly request of the search engines to end the 
indexation of personal information. “It is a request based on the personal will to keep 
this information inaccessible, when the person concerned considers that knowledge of 
this information can damage them or wants to forget the information”. (Fundamento de 
Derecho 13. Criteria for balancing) It is an individual’s decision whether information 
should remain accessible on the Internet. In respecting this right, the search engines are 
obliged to de-index undesired content. As the Spanish  National High Court has said: it 
is a “personal power of disposition”. (Fundamento de Derecho 13. Criteria for 
balancing) Google fought this idea, saying that it wasn’t logical that the mere will of a 
person could justify the duty of the search engine to delete personal data. From 
Google’s point of view, this can be justified only if the personal data processing were 
incompatible with the directive or if there were legitimate reasons resulting from the 
particular situation of the person in question. The European Court of Justice has pointed 
out that it is not possible to take only incompatibility with the directive on personal data 
protection into account when considering a person’s right to request the deletion of 
personal data. The main circumstance which must be taken into account is the effect of 
the time elapsed. Therefore, it is possible that something which was legitimately 
published by a newspaper or website can become “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer 
relevant, or excessive in proportion with the aims of these personal data processed” 
(N.93 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) and Mario Costeja González) in the context of the search engine activity. This 
means that in-compatibility with the law is no longer a  solid criteria that can serve as 
the grounds for this personal prerogative facing Internet search engines. It will be 
necessary to go beyond legal texts and to create a balance in order to know definitively 
whether accessibility to personal data is or is not compatible with the directive. Taking 
into account the definition of the “right to be forgotten”, the decision of the Spanish 
National High Court has confirmed what the European Court of Justices pointed out in 
its answers to the preliminary consultation made by the Spanish Court: 
1. The search engine can be obliged to de-index a list of search results linked to the 
name of a person, even if the initial diffusion of this information was legitimate: 
 
“The manager of a search engine is obliged to delete from the list of search results obtained after a 
search via the name of a person, links to web sites that have been published by third parties and which 
contain information related to this person; and also in the case that this name or the personal 
information haven't been deleted previously or simultaneously in these web sites, and, even, if the 
publication in these pages is essentially licit” (Fundamento de Derecho 13- Criteria of Balancing). 
 
2. It is not necessary that the accessibility of the personal information causes prejudice 
to the person concerned, for the application of the "right to be forgotten", because: 
 
The right to privacy and the protection of personal data (art. 7 and 8 European Union 
Charter of Rights) prevails, in principle, not only upon the economic power of the 
manager of the search engine, but over the interest of the public to access the above-
mentioned information, in a search by the name of this person”, with the exception of 
the case where there is somebody who has a role in public life or a similar 
circumstance. In this last case, “the trespass on their fundamental rights would be 
justified due to a preponderant interest of the public in having access to this 
information (…)” (Cfr. Fundamento de Derecho 13.- Criteria of balancing). 
 
The Spanish National High Court formed an interpretation of the arguments of the 
European Court of Justice decision based mainly on those principles and criteria which 
are applicable to the facts that are judged. Those are the need to balance the rights in 
conflict; the consideration of the relevance of the criteria of the time elapsed; the need 
for a fair balance between the legitimate interest of Internet users to access information; 
and the rights of a person concerned by this information. This is a balance that depends 
on “the nature of the information, the sensitive character of the information towards the 
intimacy of the person concerned, and the interest of the audience in having this 
information” and that “can vary depending on the role that this particular person plays 
in public life”. (Fundamento de Derecho 13.- Criteria of balancing) The outcome of 
balancing different interests can also be different depending on whether the processing 
was made by a search engine, in origin or by a website. 
It is noteworthy that the decision of the Spanish National High Court follows the 
procedure set by the European Court of Justice by which one can make a request to the 
manager of data processing to delete the information and, if they don’t respond, that the 
request can be addressed to the data authority or to the courts. There is one regard, 
however, in which the Spanish Court goes beyond the arguments of the European Court 
of Justice, in the sense that the prevalence of the protection of personal data cannot be 
understood as an absolute right, under any criteria: 
 
“(…) from the Decision (of the European Court of Justice) a prevalence of the right of personal 
data protection (….) is deduced. However, this prevalence of the right to oppose the data 
processing by its holder upon the legitimate interest of the manager of a search engine is neither 
absolute nor alien to the particular personal situation of the claimant, with the only exception that 
the law could set a different provision. The protection of personal data is one example of the 
protection of the fundamental right to privacy. However, it may be justified to interfere with and 
limit that right when, as provided by law, such interference or limitation is considered a necessary 
measure in a democratic society to safeguard other interests, including the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others, as established in Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights of 4 
November 1950 and in Art. 52.1 and 52.3 of the European Charter” (Fundamento de Derecho 13.- 
Criteria of balancing). 
 
Conclusion 
The right to be forgotten – as recently approved by the European Court of Justice in the 
Decision of May 2014 and as the Spanish National High Court applied it in the Decision 
of December 2014 – allows that personal information disseminated on the Internet by 
search engines, and therefore out of the concerned person’s control, may be deleted if 
the concerned person demands so. This right can be applied if the following conditions 
expressed by the European Court of Justice are present: the data must be “inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes towards 
which the data processing was aimed” (N. 93 Case C- 131/12, 13 May 2014 Google 
Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and 
Mario Costeja González). If the indexation of someone’s personal data is performed by 
a company based in Spain, it will be balanced with the freedom of expression and the 
right to information following the balancing criteria set by the Spanish Constitutional 
Court. The right to personal data protection is, in principle, dependent upon the 
economic interests of the managers of search engines and upon of the citizens’ right to 
access this data on the Internet. The right to informative self-determination is currently 
gaining ground in European legislation. It offers a formulation of data protection rights 
that is better suited to the reality of an information society. 
As a more concrete result, the decision of the European Court of Justice has 
established a means to resolve conflicts between citizens and search engines. This is 
possible thanks to the right of every person to ask the manager of the search engine for 
the deletion of their data when it is “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant” (N. 93 
Case C-131/12, 13 May 2014 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Coseja González) under the control of the 
proper authorities, and, in particular, of the Data Protection Authorities. Eight months 
after the publication of the decision of the European Court of Justice, the news agency 
Reuters reported 200,000 submissions for the deletion of Internet links in Europe, which 
would affect around 700,000 URLs by the right to be forgotten. 
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